Dos conceptos centrales para comprender la obra de Enrique Dussel son los de totalidad y exterioridad. Ambos aparecen en toda la variedad temática de su obra: en trabajos de ética, de historia de la filosofía, de filosofía política, teología o de crítica económica. Este artículo se propone un recorrido por ambos conceptos teniendo en cuenta la presencia de una doble argumentación: una de corte filosófica y otra de raíz histórica. El objetivo es poner en evidencia cierto reenvío de uno a (...) otro plano de las argumentaciones filosófica e histórica que presenta ciertos atolladeros. Para ello, se expone primero la concepción filosófica de la totalidad y luego la necesidad de dar cuenta de su carácter estructurador: el llamado núcleo ético-mítico. Se exponen también los dos caminos ético-míticos generales que de facto tomaron las grandes civilizaciones, mostrando luego -ejemplificando con las relaciones entre cristianismo y Cristiandad- las relaciones complejas e inestables entre totalidades, la exterioridad, tanto en su dimensión metafísica como histórica, y el problema del fetichismo. Luego, introduciremos algunas consideraciones en torno a las ideas de différance y de dislocación ateniendo a su impacto en el pensamiento decolonial. A partir de allí, dada la ausencia de origen o centro trascendental, se matiza la idea de totalidad cerrada; se revisa la noción de núcleo ético-mítico en su carácter monolítico, unívoco y monovalente; y se complejiza la cuestión de la exterioridad -y su relación con la idea de víctima-poniendo en cuestión su carácter metafísico u originario. (shrink)

La memoria como ideología: las “suturas” en los discursos sobre el pasado reciente en la Argentina (período 83-89). Resumen de Tesis de Doctorado en Filosofía de Maximiliano A. Garbarino.

En esta primera parte de la entrevista, Mignolo ubica las coordenadas intelectuales en las que surge su primera obra (1995) junto con la necesidad del desarrollo del concepto de semiosis colonial, y la recepción de sus tesis en aquel momento. Describe también las posibilidades (o imposibilidades) de diálogo de la perspectiva decolonial con otras como la posmoderna y la poscolonial, refiriéndose a las diferentes inscripciones teóricas debidas, fundamentalmente, a diferencias geopolíticas. Por ello, plantea una alternativa pluri-versal al universalismo moderno occidental, (...) que intenta hacer pasar su provincialismo, cristiano primero, luego liberal y ahora neoliberal, por la verdad misma (eurocentrismo o atlanticismo). Finalmente, sitúa su “conformación cosmo-cultural” en relación con la reconstitución de conceptos que la civilización occidental fue destituyendo en su proceso de constitución del vocabulario y las subjetividades moderno-coloniales. Grupo de estudio Las nociones de transmodernidad y pluriversidad en la Filosofía de la Liberación y el giro decolonial. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo intentaré comparar dos momentos en la producción teórica de Nancy Fraser: sus análisis contemporáneos del capitalismo como orden institucional y su marco categorial previo, basado en dualismo de redistribución y reconocimiento. Destacaré tres grandes rupturas en su evolución intelectual: en el diagnóstico del presente, en la comprensión del capitalismo como tal y en la propuesta política.In this paper I will try to compare two periods in Nancy Fraser's theoretical evolution: her analysis of contemporary capitalism as an (...) institutional social order and her previous categorial framework, based on the dualims of redistribution and recognition. I will highlight three major ruptures in her intellectual development: in the diagnosis of present times, in the understanding of capitalism as such and in political proposal. (shrink)

This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...) both a make-believe theoretical element and a set-theoretical element. The fictional entity is constructed by imagining the existence of an individual with certain properties and adding a set-theoretical element consisting of the set of properties corresponding to the properties of the imagined entity. Moreover, the book advances a new combined semantic and ontological defence of the existence of fictional entities. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...) of the properties by which a certain subject is seen in a given picture as having refers to the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, i.e., to the visible surface properties of that vehicle that are responsible for the fact that one such subject is seen in it, precisely taken in such a design role. Finally, I will try to show that seeing-in is qualified by inflection independently of whether it is conscious or unconscious seeing-in. (shrink)

Insofar as the so-called new theory of reference has come to be acknowleged as the leading theoretical paradigm in semantic research, it has been widely accepted that proper names directly refer to their designation. In advancing some of the most convincing arguments in favour of this view of names, S. Kripke has however left somehow undecided what the role of context is in determining which is the direct referent for a name. According to one interpretation of his thought, context has (...) only an external task in allowing one to simultaneously select a name and a given referent for it. Although this interpretation is the most faithful to Kripke's own intentions, there is another possible interpretation of what he says, according to which context more significantly permits one to determine a given referent at a time for one and the same name1. This different interpretation of the role of context is not marginal for the purpose of semantics, since it generates two distinct theoretical conceptions of what a proper name is. According to the former, the 'idiosyncratic' conception, proper names are individuated (at least) by their form and bearer. According to the latter, the 'linguistic' conception, they are individuated by their morphology only: i.e., by their being (syntactically) unstructured strings of letters. The two conceptions prove to be substantially different when homonyms are called into play. Insofar as both the Greek philosopher and the famous shipowner are called "Aristotle", we have two distinct, albeit homonymous, names for the idiosyncratic conception but only one name (as applied to two distinct individuals) for the linguistic conception2. In what follows, I will first sketch one of the most recent attempts to support for the idiosyncratic view, namely the one which traces back to Kaplan [1990] theory of words, and recall its merits over its cognate idiosyncratic theories. I will then try to give an argument in favour of the linguistic conception, by pointing out how the latter.... (shrink)

In this paper, we want to maintain that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is basically a pragmatic issue due to the failure of participative imagination, as involving a pre-semantic level relating to a wide context (the overall situation of discourse). Since the linguistic meanings of the relevant fiction-involving sentences violate some of our basic norms, what such sentences (fictionally) say cannot be participatively imagined. That failure leads one to refrain from ascribing such sentences the fictional truth-conditions they would have in (...) narrow fictional contexts (sets of fixed parameters) as determined by those meanings in those contexts. Yet one could still make that ascription, for one can cognitively imagine what such sentences would say in those contexts. As is proved by the fact that if one either adopts an alternative view on such norms or, for some reason, brackets them, one can again perform that ascription. (shrink)

The branching-time logic called Peircean by Arthur Prior is considered and given an infinite axiomatization. The axiomatization uses only the standard deduction rules for tense logic.

In the tree-like representation of Time, two histories are undivided at a moment t whenever they share a common moment in the future of t. In the present paper, it will first be proved that Ockhamist and Peircean branching-time logics are unable to express some important sentences in which the notion of undividedness is involved. Then, a new semantics for branching-time logic will be presented. The new semantics is based on trees endowed with an indistinguishability function, a generalization of the (...) notion of undividedness. It will be shown that Ockhamist and Peircean semantics can be viewed as limit cases of the semantics developed in this paper. (shrink)

En su obra Mil mesetas, Deleuze y Guattari ofrecen una perspectiva singular sobre el lenguaje, concebido como un sistema de signos interconectados y fluidos, donde el significado surge de las relaciones intrincadas dentro de este sistema. Este artículo evalúa la influencia de Deleuze y Guattari en la lingüística contemporánea y explora las diferencias entre su enfoque y la lingüística estructural propuesta por Saussure. Deleuze y Guattari introducen la noción de máquina como un quiebre radical con los enfoques estructurales tradicionales, al (...) concebir el lenguaje como un sistema dinámico y en constante transformación. Este enfoque contrasta con la lingüística estructural, que concibe el lenguaje como un sistema estático y autónomo. (shrink)

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...) does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?). (shrink)

In this paper I want to hold, first, that one may suitably reconstruct the relevant kind of mental representational states that fiction typically involves, make-beliefs, as contextually unreal beliefs that, outside fiction, are either matched or non-matched by contextually real beliefs. Yet moreover, I want to claim that the kind of make-believe that may yield the mark of fictionality is not Kendall Walton’s invitation or prescription to imagine. Indeed, in order to appeal in terms of make-believe to a specific form (...) of imagination that fiction distinctively involves, one must move away from the realm of norms in order to attain a cognitive realm; namely, one must look at a specific form of metarepresentational state. This metarepresentational state of make-believe is a second-order representation that is about both real beliefs and make-beliefs, as the first-order representations it compares by acknowledging their contextual distinctness. (shrink)

In The Theory of Objects, Alexius Meinong used true negative existentials to argue in favour of non-existent objects: in order to assert veridically that an object O does not exist, one has to refer to O itself1. From Bertrand Russell's "On Denoting" onwards, it has become a commonplace to say that this argument does not work. For every sentence apparently concerning non-existents one can provide a paraphrase which eliminates the singular term contained in it and therefore dispels the illusion of (...) a reference to a non-existent item2. As is well known, this strategy implies that such a singular term is a camouflaged definite description. However, Saul Kripke and other supporters of the so-called new theory of reference have claimed that singular terms directly referring to their designation (ordinary proper names, indexicals, mass and substance terms: from now on, DR terms) are not at all synonymous with descriptions. In their opinion, true negative existentials represent no exception to this claim. In what follows I would like to stress that, though Kripke's critique of the Russellian treatment of negative existentials is convincing, his treatment of true negative existentials containing a DR term is flawed. Nor do other contemporary accounts that share Kripke's critique as far as these sentences are concerned fare any better. In fact, I think that Meinong's argument may be correct where true negative existentials containing DR terms are concerned. But I shall aim to demonstrate this elsewhere. (shrink)

Creationism with respect to fictional entities, i.e., the position according to which ficta are creations of human practices, has recently become the most popular realist account of fictional entities. For it allows one to hold that there are fictional entities while simultaneously giving such entities a respectable metaphysical status, that of abstract artifacts. In this paper, I will draw what are the ontological and semantical consequences of this position, or at least of all its forms that are genuinely creationist. For (...) some people, these consequences will sound as plagues against the position; for some others, especially realists on ficta, they are welcome results. Although I hold that all forms of genuine creationism have these consequences, I will conclude by explaining why I take moderate creationism, according to which ficta are created by means of a reflexive stance on the make-believe practice grounding them, to be the best of these forms. (shrink)

: In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos provides a new defense of the thesis that, unlike early vision, late vision is cognitively penetrable, in accordance with a new definition of cognitive penetrability that is centered on the ideas of direct influence of cognition upon perception and of the epistemic role of perception. This new definition allows him to maintain that late vision is a genuinely perceptive stage of the perceptual process. In this paper, I try (...) to discuss not only whether this new definition has plausible consequences that allow only late vision to be cognitively penetrable but also whether the claim that late vision is genuinely perceptual allows it to have the kind of hybrid content, half nonconceptual and half conceptual, that Raftopoulos now wants to ascribe to it. Keywords: Cognitive Penetrability, weak, strong, and superstrong; Early and Late Vision; Nonconceptual Content Penetralibità cognitiva e visione secondaria Riassunto: In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos dà una nuova difesa della tesi secondo cui, a differenza della visione primaria, la visione secondaria è penetrabile cognitivamente, secondo una nuova definizione della nozione di penetrabilità cognitiva centrata sulle idee di influenza diretta della cognizione sulla percezione e di ruolo epistemico della percezione. Questa nuova definizione gli consente di sostenere che la visione secondaria è una fase genuinamente percettiva del processo percettivo. Nell’articolo, provo a discutere non solo se la nuova definizione ha conseguenze plausibili che consentono solo alla visione secondaria di essere penetrabile cognitivamente, ma anche se l’idea che la visione secondaria sia genuinamente percettiva consente ad essa di avere il contenuto ibrido, in parte nonconcettuale e in parte concettuale, che Raftopoulos vuole ora ascriverle. Parole chiave: Penetrabilità cognitiva debole, forte e superforte; Visione primaria e secondaria; Contenuto nonconcettuale. (shrink)

Although both belong to the domain of the nonexistent, there is an ontological distinction between ficta and possibilia. Ficta are a particular kind of abstract objects, namely constructed abstract objects which generically depend on authors for their subsistence. Moreover, they are essentially incomplete entities, in that they are correlates of finite sets of properties. - On the other hand, possibilia are concrete objects. Being a possible object is indeed being an entity that might have existed, that is, that might have (...) been involved in the causal order. Besides, as an object existent in this sense may legitimately be qualified as complete, the incompleteness which pertains to possible objects is contingent, in that it regards them only with respect to the possible worlds in which they do not exist. This ontological distinction has a semantic correlate: whereas names for possibilia are full-fledged directly referential terms, names for ficta are synonymous with de facto rigid descriptions of a complex sort. (shrink)

The paper attempts at yielding a language-independent argument in favour of fictional entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of such entities. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works. It will also be evaluated to what extent this argument is close to other arguments recently provided to the same purpose.

As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...) the above phenomenal character, or it is a sui generis phenomenal property, thereby giving its own contribution to the overall phenomenal character of that state. Yet neither way sounds ultimately satisfying. For the indirect way may work only under the assumption that intentionality is monadic. Since the direct way explicitly endorses this assumption, the indirect way must give pride of place to it. Yet the direct way seems to be unsuccessful, in any of its forms. Thus, the phenomenal intentionality research program ought to give way to another research program concerning intentionality. (shrink)

1. La trasformazione dei principi di legittimazione degli ordinamenti giuridici contemporanei -- 2. I mutamenti nel sistema giuridico -- 3. Analisi del linguaggio giuridico, legistica e legimatica -- 4. I diritti difficili nel sistema giuridico.

Once one draws a distinction between loyal non-existent items, which do not exist in a non-universal sense of the first-order existence predicate, and non-items, which fail to exist in a universal sense of that predicate, one may allow for the former but not for the latter in the overall ontological domain, so as to adopt a form of soft Parmenideanism. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for this distinction.

A brief theoretical review of the current state of the art of embodiment research in clinical psychology has been expounded in order to highlight the key role that embodied conceptualization has on the understanding and explanation of several mental disorders, such as eating disorders, schizophrenia and depression. Evidence has suggested that mental disorders may be explained as disturbances of embodiment, from the disembodiment to the hyperembodiment. In order to understand how some clinical conditions are affected by cultural models, we propose (...) and define a new framework called Exbodiment, complementary to the Embodiment approach to cognition. Mental disorder is strictly related to the subject-culture interaction that may be explained as a two way process in which embodiment and exbodiment are complementary points of view. In this perspective, embodiment may be seen as the “top-down” process, while exbodiment the “bottom-up” one. The introduction of exbodiment conceptualization highlights how subject is both receiver and interpreter of social influence. Subject is the target of a cultural pressure and, at the same time, enacts its own embodied culture in world. Exbodiment conceptualization may help clinicians to better understand and explain the role of culture in the onset and maintenance of mental disorders. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to tackle the Molyneux question thoroughly, by addressing it in terms of both ordinary perception and pictorial perception: if a congenitally blind person recovered sight, could she recognize visually the 3D shapes she already recognized tactilely, both when such shapes are given to her directly and when they are given to her pictorially, i.e., as depicted shapes? We want to claim that empirical evidence suggests that the question can be positively answered in both cases. For (...) in the first case, such evidence shows that perception of 3D shapes is supramodal; namely, it can be equivalently achieved in different sense modalities, notably touch and vision, independently of the sensory input such shapes are accessed. While in the second case, such evidence shows that one can satisfy both in vision and in touch the condition for depicted shapes, which are typically not where the perceiver is, to be grasped by that perceiver in a picture’s subject, i.e., what the picture presents. This condition states that the picture’s vehicle, i.e., the typically 2D physical basis of a picture, is enriched by adding to its properties the 3D grouping properties that allow for a figure/ground segmentation to be performed in that vehicle’s elements. (shrink)

The Second World War symbolizes how a radical evil can be embodied in human minds. After holocaust many scholars tried to bond Frederic Nietzsche as theprecursor of Nationalsocialism. Quite aside from such a fallacy, the present article not only intends to recover the thought of this outstanding philosopher but also trace on the roots of ancient Norse mythology in the inception of existentialism and capitalism. Echoing the contribution of a previous article written originally by Martin Jenkins, we put our efforts (...) in explaining the liaison between mythical archetype and the world of ideas. (shrink)

An attempt is first made to clarify why Stephen Schiffer may legitimately claim that his noncompositional account of meaning differs from other non-compositional semantic doctrines such as the hidden-indexical theory of propositional attitudes. Subsequently, however, doubt is cast upon Schiffer's main contention that, as far as language of thought is concerned, a compositional supervenience theory can adequately satisfy all the desiderata a compositional meaning theory is traditionally called upon for. This doubt basically depends on the fact that, once a physical (...) property is assigned by the compositional supervenience theory to the relevant nominal constituent of a Mentalese attitude report as the basic element on which the physical property assigned to the whole report depends, such a property precisely plays the role of a mode of presentation of the referent of that constituent. Finally, the following dilemma is arisen: in order to account for the meaning of attitude reports either the dismissal of modes of presentation or the rejection of compositionality is to be given up. (shrink)

Carnap (1932) famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately reads Heidegger’s famous dictum “the nothing nothings” in a Russellian fashion, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sentence has to be evaluated – not as to its meaning but as to its truth (...) – lies at the metaphysico-ontological level. (shrink)

Ante a la necesidad de superar un modelo de déficit en la enseñanza de la prehistoria, este estudio presenta una metodología que se define como una práctica performática para la enseñanza de la prehistoria, compuesta y articulada por recursos y estrategias tales como el cuento motor, el juego dramático, la didáctica del objeto y las simulaciones. El objetivo de la investigación es desarrollar una metodología poliarticulada para la enseñanza de la prehistoria basada en la comprensión. Se parte del paradigma sociocrítico (...) y con enfoque mixto cualitativo-cuantitativo se analiza la incidencia de esta metodología en una muestra de 176 alumnas y alumnos de Educación Primaria. Los resultados expresan que la práctica performática para la enseñanza de la prehistoria ofrece niveles óptimos de comprensión de la temporalidad remota, en un contexto de construcción colectiva del conocimiento, de dialogicidad y motivación. Al mismo tiempo los resultados invitan a reflexionar sobre la importancia de implicar al cuerpo y al movimiento en contextos tradicionalmente relegados como son las clases de Ciencias Sociales. (shrink)

Dans la perspective de Gilbert Durand, cette étude traite de la conception de la création en général et, en particulier, de la création littéraire. Dans un premier temps, elle met l’accent sur le rôle de la création artistique en valorisant l’impératif de l’œuvre, puis, dans un second temps, sur celui de la création littéraire. Le but est de réfléchir sur la création et aussi sur son propre contenu, constitué de sens et de significations, du point de vue de l’imaginaire. La (...) méthodologie est basée sur le couple compréhension-explication de l’œuvre de l’auteur. En conclusion, il est important de souligner que la conception de la création durandienne s’exprime à travers l’impératif de l’œuvre, du lointain et de la fonction fantastique de l’imaginaire. The present study deals, from the perspective of Gilbert Durand, with the conception of creation, in general, and of the literary creation, in particular. At first, it focuses on the role of artistic creation by valuing the imperative of the work while, in a second moment, it focuses on the literary creation. The objective is to reflect on the creation and its own content, constituted of senses and meanings, from the perspective of the imaginary. The methodology is based on the explanation-understanding binomial and on the author’s work. As a conclusion, it is important to underline that the conception of Durandian creation is told through the imperative of the work, the Remote and the fantastic function of the imaginary. (shrink)